Collateral plays a central role in monetary policy. In recent years, its importance has increased as uncollateralised inter-bank borrowing has gradually been replaced by collateralised central bank lending. This has in turn affected collateral availability and the need for high-quality assets. The European Central Bank has reacted to this development by creating a series of different measures to broaden collateral availability, including changing the eligibility rules (e.g. reducing rating thresholds for certain asset classes) or extending the eligible assets (e.g. allowing national central banks to accept bank loans as collateral). In the context of these developments, this article assesses and comments on various aspects of the Eurosystem collateral policy and overall framework. In particular, it examines the economic implications of the current ECB collateral policy for asset allocation and relative asset price developments from a cross-country perspective.
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How has the ECB's collateral policy developed in recent years? Has liquidity provision been effective? For the latter, the ECB had to ensure that banks were technically able to collateralise the refi nancing credit which they obtained from their home country's national central bank (NCB) . 6 Yet this has led to some clustered shortages of collateral, and in turn posed the risk of hampering the transmission mechanism in some regions. 7 Collateral criteria thus played a major role during the crisis. 8 The ECB decision to maintain or even raise collateral availability favoured those assets whose eligibility would increase bank lending, particularly to small-and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and private households. This included asset-backed securities (ABS) as a securitised form of claims and credit claims as a non-securitised form. 9 In more general terms, collateral policy has three important aspects. First, when there is stress in the markets, the central bank can counter the threat of collateral scarcity by increasing the eligible assets pool and thereby framing the markets' process of identifying high-quality assets. 10 Second, central bank lending (like all lending) entails non-negligible risks which are ultimately shouldered by the public sector and the taxpayer. Lending solely in exchange for good collateral could mitigate this problem. 11 In the light of the increasing degree of collateral scarcity, the main risk faced by central banks is credit risk. They could therefore defi ne less liquid assets as eligible collateral as well. But this trade-off between liquidity and credit risk may restrict a central bank's fl exibility by tying up parts of its balance sheet. 12 Third, when policy rates reach the zero lower bound and central banks grant liquidity to an unlimited extent, the eligible collateral un-6 J. E b e r l , C. We b e r, op. cit., p. 1. doubtedly plays a decisive role in setting the limits of expansionary monetary policy.
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Against this background, this paper discusses and assesses various aspects of the Eurosystem's collateral policy and overall framework. In particular, it considers the economic implications of the current ECB collateral policy for asset allocation and relative asset price developments in a cross-country perspective. Of course, a complete analysis of complex euro area collateral policy issues spanning multiple years is beyond the scope of this paper. However, Eberl and Weber provide a very comprehensive survey on Eurosystem collateral policy.
14 Eligibility and use of collateral: guiding principles
Contrary to its counterparts such as the US Federal Reserve Bank, which tends to work with a very small number of primary dealers, the ECB's monetary policy is decentralised, meaning that it interacts with numerous counterparties in the form of national central banks. 15 To be eligible as counterparties, fi nancial institutions must be fi nancially sound.
Article 18.1 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks demands that all Eurosystem credit operations shall be backed by "adequate collateral". This concept of adequacy is based on two basic notions. First, collateral has to preserve the Eurosystem from losses through the bank's credit operations. Second, there has to be sufficient collateral provided to enable the Eurosystem to carry out its tasks. 16 While the "single list" of eligible assets constitutes the general framework, it is the ECB's collateral eligibility criteria for assets -the general and the temporary eligibility rules -that ensure collateral adequacy. Important eligibility criteria that were originally considered 
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temporary have since been incorporated into the general framework or are enforced without any expiration date.
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The actual transaction behind a monetary policy operation to provide liquidity usually represents a reverse transaction such as a collateralised loan or a repurchase agreement. 18 In the latter case, the NCB claims the collateral in case the counterparty defaults. The adjusted market value of the assets which are provided as collateral has to exceed the liquidity provision's volume throughout the whole period. To fi gure out the collateral's adjusted market value, a haircut is applied to the market value of the fi nancial asset used as collateral. 19 This haircut is calculated according to the liquidity and the maturity of the security and thus represents the ECB's risk control measure to protect its balance sheet. 20 Five general principles of the ECB's collateral framework are of central importance: (1) close links between counterparties, (2) provisions for controlling risk within the pool of collateral, (3) the valuation of eligible assets, (4) the European Credit Assessment Framework that the ECB uses to assess the eligible assets' credit quality, and (5) "segmental pooling". 21 
Close links between counterparties
The non-eligibility of assets incorporating close links between counterparties was already contained in the initial General Framework dated 1 January 2001. If assets are guaranteed or issued by the counterparty submitting those, they were deemed ineligible (Directive 2000/12/ EC). The most extreme case of close links is the own use of assets -for example, when an asset is both issued and pledged by the same party. 22 However, strict eligibility rules have been watered down in the wake of the crisis. 23 Starting in February 2009, for instance, all debt instruments which are defi ned by close links between counterparties have been treated as eligible, as long as they are secured by the guarantee of a government of a eurozone country and are in compliance with the general eligibility criteria. As of March 2015, however, the ECB will no longer accept as collateral government-guaranteed uncovered bank bonds or covered bonds with close links between counterparties. 24 
Risk control measures
The risks incurred by the ECB when it conducts monetary policy operations comprise the risk of counterparty default as well as liquidity and market risks specifi c to the collateral. The ECB applies a number of measures to control risk to marketable and non-marketable assets in an effort to mitigate such risks. From March 2004 on, the ECB's most frequently used risk control measures were "valuation haircuts" and "variation margins". In 2010 the bank broadened its risk control framework to include the so-called "application of supplementary haircuts" and "limits in relation to the use of unsecured debt instruments".
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Valuation of assets eligible as collateral Valuation principles are very important because they establish rules for assessing assets that are used as collateral. The valuation assigned to assets forms the basis for the application of risk control measures and the granting of refi nancing credits. Errors in the valuation of collateral impose signifi cant risks for the conduct of monetary policy and the ECB's balance sheet. If an asset were overvalued and thus did not mirror the true underlying risk, the value of the collaterised security might not be suffi cient to cover ECB losses in case of the counterparty's default. 26 Valuation principles were broadly formulated in the initial General Framework. As is the case with the framework as a whole, these principles have been successively modifi ed over time. The Eurosystem currently assesses the marketable assets' value on the basis of a representative price prevailing on the last business day before the valuation date. If two or more prices are quoted, the smallest price is used. If no such price is available, the last trading price is used. If the latter is not available or prices have not moved over the last fi ve trading days, either the asset's theoretical value or, for reasons of simplicity, the outstanding amount is used. The Eurosystem applies additional valuation haircuts for the value of covered/uncovered bank bonds and ABSs not derived from a market price.
27

Monetary Policy
European Credit Assessment Framework
In January 2007, the ECB created the Eurosystem Credit Assessment Framework to evaluate the credit standing of collateral employing different credit assessment sources. The ECB had imposed a distinct hierarchy of credit ratings: type of issue comes fi rst, followed by the issuer and then the guarantor. NCBs are said to have occasionally violated this hierarchy by classifying assets in the wrong rating categories -always erring in favour of the banks that submitted the securities. 28 In September 2013, the ECB modifi ed, i.e. watered down, the credit ranking by de facto equating issuer and guarantor in the credit ranking hierarchy. 29 
Segmental pooling
The ECB employs its measures of risk control, usually "valuation haircuts", to attenuate the risks inherent in granting refi nancing credits. These haircuts do not increase with lower credit ratings, however, but differ by the coupon structure and the respective residual maturity and the liquidity categories in which assets are classifi ed. 30 Drechsler et al. report that, contrary to the private market, the ECB subsidises with its haircut policy some assets to the disadvantage of others. 31 In particular, they fi nd that haircut subsidies turn out to be small for non-risky collateral but large in case of less safe collateral. This makes plausible that the pooled haircut value relates to the risk profi le of a fairly safe asset and not to that of the lowestrated asset within each segment. This subsidy on low-rated eligible collateral in terms of requirements for refi nancing credits constitutes an incentive for counterparties to progressively use riskier assets as collateral underlying the ECB's refi nancing credits.
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Changing the eligibility rules to increase collateral availability
We now assess both in quantitative and qualitative terms the extent to which the ECB's eligible collateral pool has been broadened since the onset of the crisis. We provide an overview of the chronological sequence of the changes, structured by asset classes. We defi ne a reduction of rating thresholds for certain asset classes as a typi-28 M. B r e n d e l , S. J o s t : EZB leistet sich gefährliche Regelverstöße, in:
Die Welt, 7 April 2013. 29 J. E b e r l , C. We b e r, op. cit., pp. 13-14. 30 J. E b e r l , C. We b e r, op. cit., pp. 11ff., 19ff. 31 I. D r e c h s l e r et al., op. cit. 32 J. E b e r l , C. We b e r, op. cit., pp. 16ff. cal change in a collateral eligibility rule. The following two items are prominent examples of such changes.
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Example 1: The ECB's effort to shape and bring into force a coherent collateral framework was brought to an abrupt halt in September 2008 by the Lehman collapse. In October 2008, the ECB reduced the minimum credit rating threshold for eligible assets (excluding ABSs) from "single A" to "triple B". 34 With this move, the ECB central bank initiated one of the most sweeping changes ever to its collateral framework. What is more, the ECB employed a uniform add-on haircut on all eligible assets rated lower than single A in order to cope with the additional risk implied by such low-rated assets. This reduction was initially planned as a temporary measure, but became permanent in January 2011 when the lowered minimum credit rating threshold became part of the General Framework.
Example 2: In February 2009, the ECB passed an amendment which may at fi rst appear minor but is highly signifi cant in practice. The group of accepted External Credit Assessment Institutions (ECAIs) was expanded to include a fourth one, the Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS). Compared to the "big three" rating agencies -S&P, Moody's and Fitch, which together hold a market share of about 95 per cent -DBRS is a small Canada-based agency. Admittedly, taking into account one additional ECAI may spur competition and improve information on collateral quality. If assessments among rating agencies differ, however, a tiny rating agency is granted the potential to affect refi nancing conditions of European commercial banks. The experience with the long-term credit ratings of the four ECAIs for Ireland, Italy and Spain clearly reveal that the DBRS ratings have been pivotal.
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Expanding the set of eligible assets
Allowing national central banks to accept bank loans as collateral may be regarded as one of several measures that expanded the set of assets eligible for collateral. Here we provide some examples.
Debt instruments issued or guaranteed by governments
Government guarantees for risky assets are important because they represent a risk for taxpayers in case of default and they are able to impact the valuation and thus the credit rating of the collateral, which affects the refinancing conditions.
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The minimum credit rating threshold for government-related assets had already been diminished to "triple B" when the minimum rating was similarly lowered for all assets, except for ABSs, in October 2008. Nevertheless, several countries had to make strong efforts to reach even this threshold. 36 In order to accept these debt instruments as collateral, the ECB decided to suspend the application of the minimum credit rating threshold for debt instruments guaranteed or issued by the governments of Greece (May 2010), Ireland (April 2011), Portugal (July 2011) and Cyprus (May 2013). At the same time, the ECB declared that it would review "the relevant risk control measures [...] on a continuous basis". 37 However, since this decision, tenets for valuation haircuts have been altered for Cyprus and Greece but not for Portugal and Ireland. Hence, for the latter countries, the ECB is effectively applying the same valuation haircut to, for instance, a "C"-rated bond as to a "BBB+"-rated bond. 38 However, given that Greek debt was apparently accepted as collateral to raise market liquidity, it would be counterproductive to insist on a large haircut. Thus, it appears that the ECB's aim to promote the liquidity of Greek debt will necessarily increase the bank's exposure to the risk of capital losses on exactly that type of debt. If such losses occur, the ECB can at best hope to receive compensation, for instance through a (gradual) re-capitalisation by euro area governments.
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The ECB broadened the eligibility of own-use assets to every asset with government guarantees in February 2009. This enabled market participants to securitise assets into bonds they retain. These bonds are, however, never evaluated by a rating agency or the market per se. Due to the government guarantee, they can also still be employed as collateral for refi nancing credits. What is more, the conditions for valuation haircuts would appear favourable to market participants if the rating of the government providing the guarantee is higher than that of the issuer. On the date the guidelines setting out the eligibility of own-use government-guaranteed debt instruments were implemented, new issuances of bonds guaranteed by governments skyrocketed. Declaring these bonds eligible in combination with abandoning the minimum credit rating has thus pushed a signifi cant share of these bonds into reverse transactions underlying refi nancing credits at the ECB.
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Debt instruments traded on non-regulated markets
The initial General Framework has already incorporated the condition that marketable assets have to be permitted to be traded on accepted regulated and non-regulated markets. 41 The ECB has successively altered its eligibility criteria, thereby raising the number of eligible non-regulated markets over time. 42 When strict rules are applied for the admission of nonregulated markets, the risk assumed by the ECB for the eligibility of assets traded on those markets is approximately the same as it is for assets traded on regulated markets. However, the ECB explicitly denied pursuing the goal of exhaustively evaluating the intrinsic quality of nonregulated markets. Furthermore, the three principles that the ECB established to accept non-regulated markets have not been applied in a consistent way and are thus of questionable effectiveness. In particular, transparency which is meant to grant the ECB "unimpeded access to information on the market's rules of procedure and operations, the fi nancial features of the assets, the price formation mechanism, and the relevant prices and quantities" 43 has not only been suspended repeatedly but has also not been applied rigorously. 44 Asset-backed securities, corporate bonds and bank bonds Figure 1 summarises the evolution of asset-backed securities as eligible collateral over time.
When asked about the ratings of the ABSs that the ECB would purchase, Mario Draghi replied that the ECB had been accepting ABSs as collateral for ten years. Hence, he argued, it was logical to maintain the ECB's standard collateral rules for purchases. However, Draghi also clarifi ed once more that ABS purchases bear a larger risk than ABSs accepted as collateral in refi nancing operations. 45 Corporate bonds have always been eligible for collateral purposes under the condition that they comply with the general criteria for the eligibility of marketable assets. Corporate bonds have therefore also been subject to all of the general changes in the eligibility criteria that have been applied to marketable assets, 46 although no specifi c provisions have been established to date. 47 Due to space limitations, this paper does not discuss bank bonds. However, important details can be found in Eberl and Weber. above. 50 The ECB intensifi ed its collateral policy activity beginning in 2008 in response to the crisis and then again in 2011. This activity was preponderantly targeted at softening eligibility criteria (intensive margin) while also expanding the eligible collateral pool (extensive margin).
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Main patterns of ECB collateral policies
The ECB enlarged the pool of eligible collateral in quantitative terms, i.e. at the extensive margin. The ECB's policy of full allotment of refi nancing credit ensured that banks disposed of a critical mass of paper to collateralise their refi nancing credit. 51 This process is sketched in Figure 2 with an index for the breadth of the collateral pool. The index shows a quantitative increase in the breadth of the collateral pool equivalent to a factor of 36. 52 However, the ECB also extended its pool of eligible collateral qualitatively, i.e. at the intensive margin. This index displays a qualitative enlargement of the collateral pool Lowering of minimum credit rating for
Monetary Policy
by a factor of 110. In other words, the quality standards for eligible collateral had been signifi cantly lowered by the end of 2013. 53 The much greater qualitative broadening since the collapse of Lehman Brothers compared to the quantitative expansion of the collateral base stands in sharp contrast to common calls for appropriate collateral.
Economic implications of the current ECB collateral policy
We will now use a cross-country perspective to consider the economic implications of the current ECB collateral 53 J. E b e r l , C. We b e r, op. cit., pp. 44-45. policy for asset allocation and relative asset price developments.
Implications for asset allocation in the euro area
The analysis presented above shows that the collateral framework has produced two major effects over time. First, the Eurosystem reached its target of increasing the available quantity of collateral. Second, this in turn worsened the quality of the ECB's pool of collateral for refi nancing credits. 54 This latter effect has been the most important element of the ECB's toolbox. It allows NCBs to grant large-scale special loans to their national commercial banks. 55 In order to guarantee the value of the collateral, the ECB started to buy collateral, starting with €223 bn of sovereign bonds and now committing itself to ABS purchases.
However, these measures will create an incentive for commercial banks to construct new ABS paper (which may become increasingly toxic) to clean up their balance sheets. 56 Moreover, the banks' equity capital will be artifi cially increased due to the increase in the value of the non-sold assets. Hence, policymakers should fi rst check whether this kind of collateral policy represents a hidden fi scal rescue of commercial banks, and if so, whether this 54 J. E b e r l , C. We b e r, op. cit., p. 18. 55 G. I l l i n g , P. K ö n i g , op. cit., pp. 21-22. 56 See, however, M. D r a g h i : Introductory statement to the press conference (with Q&A), Naples, op. cit., who cites evidence in favor of much less risk in terms of default probabilities contained in euro area ABSs than in the US ABSs. was the intended aim. Second, policymakers should scrutinise whether this approach is compatible with the commonly formulated European target of closing the investment gap in the euro area. It seems counterproductive to use the ECB's collateral policy to re-channel savings towards the eurozone periphery. Indeed, ABS purchases resulting from an overly lax ABS collateral policy could do precisely that, yielding the risk of a similarly destructive impact on both the public sector and the real estate sector as in the years before the euro crisis. 60 As a consequence, policy responses were also quite similar. The second stage of the crisis, however, was unique to the euro area.
Further issues
Collateral policy determines the attractiveness of certain asset classes, which in turn are the target of the ECB's current purchases (asset-backed securities, covered bonds and soon perhaps corporate bonds as well). It is important to prevent the resulting incentives from unlock- ing these asset markets to an excessive extent through the loosening of collateral standards. 61 A key problem is the permanent nature of the "crisis collateral framework", which was originally intended to remain in place only on a temporary basis. 62 Exiting from these exceptional collateral policies will be no less difficult than abandoning unconventional monetary policies in general; the ECB will be confronted with tricky questions of how to get rid of the purchased assets as soon as the economic environment has improved. 63 Policy trade-offs Finally, there seems to be a trade-off between the shortto medium-term effi ciency of unconventional monetary policy effectiveness and the risk aversion of the ECB in terms of collateral policy. Overall, the ECB has responded forcefully to the crisis through "credit easing" and is at the same time striving to minimise its own risks. This pursuit of two opposing objectives implies that its policy has not been and will not be entirely effective. 64 In the same vein, there is now a danger that other ECB instruments might also be decreasing in their effectiveness. The implementation of its longer-term refi nancing operations (LTROs) is one example. When the ECB extended long-term funding against an expanded pool of eligible collateral assets, it also signifi cantly raised the haircuts applied to these assets, sometimes by 50 to 75 per cent. This implies that substantial over-collateralisation is needed to get access to LTRO fi nancing. For instance, commercial banks have to pledge assets with a market value somewhere between two to four times the value of the loan received, which may make commercial banks more reluctant to borrow from the central bank. Hence, in case of insolvency, the claims of unsecured creditors of banks will be met only to a minor extent. Private investors will thus hesitate even more to endow commercial banks with funding. One dire consequence of this is that the LTROs might not be successful if they are ever attempted again. 65 
Conclusions and policy implications
NCBs have in the past sometimes been too lenient with respect to the valuation and the eligibility of collateral. There is the risk that NCBs and other market participants might try to circumvent the ECB and Eurosystem collater-al rules.
66 Above all, NCBs should be prevented from exploiting loopholes present in the collateral framework with the intention of unduly promoting their domestic commercial banks. 67 As regards the ECB, a key governance challenge is to guarantee a strong commitment by the Governing Council to enforcing collateral rules. The valuation of collateral should also be based on a systematic monitoring of market data. One of the main tasks of the Governing Council is the regular review of the adequacy of risk control measures in the collateral framework. The single collateral framework shall be applied in the same way by all central banks.
As long as the risks can be shifted from the taxpayers in one euro area member state to those in another through "collateral rule arbitrage" or another of the ECB's unconventional monetary policies, statements like "[a]ll central banks must have the same interest: to reduce the risk stemming from our operations. If there is a loss it is a loss for all of us …" may be wishful thinking. 68 In the same vein, one may question whether the unanimous agreement in the Governing Council to install a compliance unit and a collateral experts network at the ECB to search for inconsistencies and factual errors in the eligible asset database is a corroboration of the common will of the Governing Council. 69 In addition, one may ask how non-partisan and non-biased the "collateral experts" are. Are they unaffected by the collateral policy choices of the ECB?
In the future, policymakers should strive for a simplifi cation of the collateral system, while not forgetting that keeping collateral available to all counterparties in the euro area is crucial in enabling the implementation of proper monetary policy. 70 Furthermore, they should ensure that the increasing degree of complexity of the system does not induce the Eurosystem to overstretch its lending to fi nancial institutions -admittedly, a technically demanding task.
The overall aim of policymakers should be to eradicate all of the temporary measures instituted during the crisis as soon as the situation in the fi nancial markets allows. One should not leave any of these assets in the permanent list, because they entail risks that would fragment the framework for European monetary policy. The general collateral
